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THE U.K. GOVERNMENT'S WHITE PAPER OF JANUARY, 1985
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I. Introduction
In January. 1985, the Government of the United Kingdom published a
White Paper [1] setting out its proposals for a new framework for investor
protection in the United Kingdom. These proposals were largely based upon
an exhaustive analysis by Professor L.C.B. Gower of the present regulatory
system and its inadequacies.
In July of 1981, the Secretary of State for Trade commissioned Professor
Gower, a research adviser on company law to the Department of Trade and
Industry ("DTI"), to undertake a review of investor protection in the United
Kingdom. The purposes of this review were threefold: to examine the existing
statutory protection required by private and business investors in securities
and other properties such as unit trusts and open-ended investment companies
[2]; to consider the need for statutory control of dealers in securities, investment consultants and investment managers: and. finally, to advise on the need
for new legislation in the area. Professor Gower was also asked to consider any
relevant developments in the European Community.
Professor Gower published a Discussion Document [3] in January. 1982.
and a report [4] in January, 1984. They were written at a time of great change
in the U.K. securities markets. Even more change in these markets has
occurred since the report's publication.
The aim of this article is to describe the regulatory framework which was in
place when Professor Gower began his task, to give an indication of the
recommendations and thrust of Professor Gower's report, and to compare that
report with the Goverment's views as set out in its recent White Paper. This
article takes note of several questions that remain unanswered by the White
Paper. It concludes that although the proposed changes may well be inevitable.
the dichotomy between regulatory power and the costs of regulation may end
up unfairly divided between the Government and the regulated.
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2. The regulatory framework
The focus of the Gower Report and the White Paper is the regulatory
framework that existed in the United Kingdom between 1981 and 1984. This
framework, which was based on a complex mixture of statutory and self-regulatory provisions, was designed mainly to regulate issues of and dealings in
securities, but not to cover other types of investments or investment advice.
The statutory provisions were created piecemeal over the years in response
to specific problems and abuses. These provisions were not far-reaching [5] and
were generally based on the principle of caveat emptor.
Self-regulatory protection is afforded by the Stock Exchange, which has its
own rules governing disclosure and the content of circulars; the Panel oil
Take-overs and Mergers ("the Panel") which supervises the City Code on
Take-overs and Mergers ("the City Code"); and the Council for the Securities
Industry ("the CSI") which promulgates codes of practice in various areas.
There is also significant reliance on the perceived importance on the part of
individuals practicing in the field of issues and take-overs of maintaining the
highest standards so as to preserve their reputations. Furthermore, there are a
number of professional bodies [6] representing such practitioners which exert
some influence in maintaining the standards which, to some degree, protect
investors.
The result is a complex edifice of statutory regulation and self-regulation
which is interlinked and interdependent. Although the structure is complex, it
has worked effectively in recent years without giving rise to any major scandal
or upheaval. Making the edifice less complex, however, is not easy because the
removal of one or two bricks is likely to unbalance the structure as a whole.
2. 1. The statutory provisions
2.1.1. The CompaniesActs
Until January, 1985, any offer of shares or debentures to the public had to
be accompanied by a prospectus that complied with the Fourth Schedule to the
Companies Act 1948, and that was registered at the Companies Registry and
open to public inspection [7]. Since that date an issue of shares by a Company
whose securities are listed on The Stock Exchange must publish listing particulars which must be registered at Companies Registry, so that the prospectus
provisions now apply only to issues of unlisted securities. However, the
prospectus provisions applied only to an issue for cash, and therefore did not,
and do not, cover a share exchange offer on a take-over [8]. Moreover, until
January, 1985, The Stock Exchange was able to dispense with the prospectus
requirement with respect to listed companies if, with regard to "the size and
other circumstances of the issue and to any limitations on the number and
class of persons to whom the issue is made, it considers compliance with the
Fourth Schedule would be unduly burdensome" [9].
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In 1980, insider dealing was made a criminal offence [10], and statutory
regulation was finally provided in an area heretofore left to self-regulation by
the Panel and The Stock Exchange. Much of the initial investigative work,
however, continues to be carried out by The Stock Exchange.
2.1.2. The Prevention of Fraud(Investments) Act 1958
The principal statute affording protection to investors in relation to an offer
to buy or sell existing securities (as opposed to an offer to subscribe or
purchase new securities) in the United Kingdom is the PFI Act 1958, which
substantially re-enacted the PFI Act 1939. The 1939 Act was enacted to
regulate the proliferation of new companies which resulted from an increase in
business activity in the 1930s, and to prohibit a number of frauds involving the
sale of shares in worthless companies as well as the offering of facilities for
"margin" transactions whereby the investor would be induced to put up cash
or securities to cover any "losses" [11].
The 1939 Act contained the basic framework that still applies under the
current PF Act. Among the surviving provisions of the 1939 Act is the
requirement that any person carrying on the business of dealing in securities
must hold a principal's license [12]. The Act also gives the DTI the power to
refuse or revoke (but not suspend) a license [13] as well as to establish rules for
the conduct of business by licensed dealers [14].
Exempted from regulation under the PFI Act are any dealings by members
of any recognized stock exchange, by a recognized association of dealers in
securities, or by the manager or trustee under any authorized unit trust scheme
[15]. Furthermore, under certain conditions the DTI can declare any person to
be an exempted dealer [16].
The principal prohibitions of the PFI Act are two criminal offenses. Any
person who induces another to enter into a contract relating to the purchase or
disposal of securities or other property by making a misleading, false, deceptive or reckless statement, promise, or forecast is guilty of deceptive inducement [17]. Additionally, the PFI Act prohibits any unauthorized distribution of
circulars concerning the purchase or disposal of securities or other property
[18]. An authorized distribution can be made by either a licensed or exempted
dealer or by a person specifically authorized by the Board of Trade (now the
DTI).
In 1939 the DTI exercised its authority under the PFI to make rules with
respect to the conduct of the business by licensed dealers ("the 1939 Rules")
[19]. Among other things, the 1939 Rules prohibited a licensed dealer from
offering to dispose of securities without an accompanying prospectus or
statement containing various details of the securities [20]. In addition, the 1939
Rules also prohibited "cold-calling" [21] and laid down rules relating to the
issue of contract notes [22] and the keeping of accounts [23].
After the 1939 Act was updated and re-enacted as the Prevention of Fraud
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(Investments) Act 1958, the 1939 Rules were also repealed. While the 1939
Rules had provided effective control over offers to dispose of securities, they
prescribed no requirements for licensed dealer to follow in offers to acquire
shares. The Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules 1960 ("the 1960
Rules"), which replaced the 1939 Rules, applied to both offers to acquire
securities and offers to dispose of them [24]. Additional rights were specified
with respect to take-over offers [25].
2.2. Self-regulation
2.2.1. The Stock Exchange
In contrast to North America, the over-the-counter market in the United
Kingdom is very small, with the vast majority of purchases and sales of
securities being conducted on The Stock Exchange. As a result, The Stock
Exchange has become the most important self-regulatory body.
Stockbrokers are obliged to conduct their business in accordance with the
rules and regulations of The Stock Exchange, its code of dealing, and its notes
of guidance. The Stock Exchange has a disciplinary function with an Appeals
Committee and penalties ranging from censure to expulsion. In 1974 financial
surveillance of firms was increased [26] and each firm is now obliged to
maintain a minimum solvency ratio, to submit annual statements, and to
submit a quarterly, unaudited balance sheet [27]. Although the rules for
distinguishing clients' funds are not strict, there is a compensation fund and
members are required to take out fidelity insurance [28]. In addition, in
October, 1981, The Stock Exchange appointed an inspector with power to
make "spot checks" on member firms.
As well as regulating the conduct of the market and market dealers, The
Stock Exchange prescribes and scrutinizes the information to be supplied when
securities are admitted to listing. Through its listing agreement, The Stock
Exchange used to impose obligations in addition to those in the Companies
Acts, for example periodical disclosure and transactions which have to be
referred to the members in a general meeting [29]. The listing agreement has
been replaced by the continuing obligations in Chapter 5 of the new Stock
Yellow Book, Admission of Securities to Listing.
The Stock Exchange also runs a lower-tier market, the Unlisted Securities
Market ("USM"). Although some of the requirements for introduction to the
USM are less onerous, those relating to disclosure and publication of information are for the most part similar to those which used to apply to the upper-tier
under the listing agreement.
2.2.2. The Panel and the Councilfor SecuritiesIndustry
In 1968, the Panel was set up under the sponsorship of various City
institutions to interpret and administer the City Code, which is now in its
eighth edition. The Panel deals only with take-over offers and associated
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matters. It is concerned with the manner in which a bid is conducted but not
with the merits of any bid nor with whether a bid is in the public interest. The
Panel also ensures that all equity shareholders are treated equally in take-over
offers.
In 1978 the persons operating in the field of securities created the Council
for the Securities Industry (CSI). Since then the CSI has played a role in
supervising, maintaining ethical standards for, initiating new codes of conduct
for [30], and resolving differences between the various segments of the securities industry.
Despite such activities, many in the City believe that the CSI has always
been more of a discussion group than a regulatory body [31]. The ambivalent
attitude expressed by the City practitioners, especially the merchant banks and
The Stock Exchange, reflects the fact that even though these institutions are
members of the CSI, they have never accepted that it had authority over them.
3. Reasons for the review of the regulatory framework
3.1. The PFTAct's shortcomings
The PFI Act came into being as a result of the share-pushing activities of
some in the 1930s. The Act was not intended to lay down universal rules as to
the disclosure required and the contents of documents, but instead was
designed to achieve its goal by trying to ensure that only fit and proper persons
dealt in securities. The result was a regime which excepted from the scope of
the regulation persons who were members of a self-regulatory system (i.e.,
members of The Stock Exchange and other recognized associations of dealers
in securities). Other persons were required to be licensed by the DTI to deal in
securities.
However, the Act also provided for exempting those who dealt only
incidentally in securities. Although it was originally anticipated that only a few
institutions and practitioners would be exempt, most merchant banks, clearing
banks, and a number of others successfully established that dealing in securities was ancillary to their principal business and that they should therefore be
exempt. Consequently, these institutions and firms could circulate offers and
take-over documents as part of their overall corporate finance business [31].
Over time the number of exempted dealers grew such that, as Professor Gower
points out, the exemption "has come to be regarded as a prized status symbol"
[32]. The perceived advantage of being an "exempted dealer" was that the
detailed rules and regulations which applied to licensed dealers did not apply
to the exempted dealer, even though the Department of Trade was obliged in
November 1977 to write to exempted dealers informing them that the DTI
expected them to comply with the licensed dealers' rules [33].
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Over the years, the narrow scope of the PFI Act and the 1960 Rules became
an increasingly apparent shortcoming. Persons who were investment advisers,
but not dealers, and investments which did not come within the Act's definition of securities were left outside the regulatory scope. Moreover, the "exempted dealers" were largely unregulated as a result of the unintended distinction
between them and licensed dealers. Also, the exemption for "professionals"
was widely abused.
The measures relating to unit trusts were a further unexpected legacy of the
PFI legislation. These measures were originally intended as temporary ones,
but were never replaced. The DTI then assumed complete control over the
establishment of new "authorized unit trusts" [34] and the variation of their
trust deeds. As a result,'a vast body of law and practice evolved which has
never been published and which is known in detail only to DTI officials.
Consequently, the authorized unit trust is the most heavily statutorily regulated
investment medium in the United Kingdom [35]. Other shortcomings included
the PFI Act's failure to define what constituted a circular, which raised
questions as to whether newspaper advertisements were covered by the legislation. Finally, there was no provision for civil liability for the making of a false
or reckless statement, nor did the DTI have the ability to suspend licenses;
they either had to grant or re-new them, or revoke them entirely.
3.2. The scandals of 1981
In addition to the perceived shortcomings of the PFI Act, certain scandals
occurred in 1981 which demonstrated that a comprehensive review of investor
protection was needed. Two incidents demonstrated the conflict of interest
which can arise in firms that manage the investment of others.
In March, 1981, an investment management company collapsed with a
deficit of some £2.5 million, causing its clients significant losses. The company
had invested some of its clients' money in its own group of companies, which
subsequently failed [36].
In the same month, The Stock Exchange formally appointed a Committee
of Investigation to inquire into certain dealings by a firm of Manchester
stockbrokers. It had been alleged that certain members of the firm were using
one of its accounts as an "open account" for the transfer of money to various,
clients on the basis of fictitious actions [37].
In both cases the problem was one of conflict of interest relating to people
whose job it was to manage the investments of others. The 1960 Rules,
however, did not have any detailed provisions requiring disclosure of conflicts
of interest. The first case also shows that once the Department of Trade
certifies a company as a licensed security dealer, the company's customers may
have very little protection. If no complaints are filed with the Department of
Trade, then no questions are asked.
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In the following month a firm of London stockbrokers collapsed. The
collapse was partially due to an outstanding debt of one of its investment
management clients. The losses were covered by The Stock Exchange's compensation fund [38).
In December of 1981. a firm of commodity brokers went into liquidation
with an estimated deficiency of some £2.8 million. The firm owed its clients a
total of £1.133 million; their funds had not, however, been kept in a separate
"trust" account and were therefore available to the firm's creditors [39]. Under
the law. the Department of Trade had no control over commodities brokers.

4. The Discussion Document
In January, 1982, following a series of informal discussions with a number
of professional bodies and individuals, Professor Gower published a "Discussion Document" [40]. In the introduction to the Discussion Document. he
stated that this review was being undertaken in conjunction with the rex ibion
of the 1960 Rules. The changes to the 1960 rules were specifically aimed at the
rules relating to the custody of investors' funds following the collapses in 1981.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to amend or extend the structure created by
the PFI Act without new primary legislation. Professor Gower was appointed
to suggest the necessary changes to the legislation.
4.1. Scope of the review
The object of Professor Gower's review was "to consider whether the
existing system of disclosure plus regulation provides adequate protection in an
efficient and economical way and, if it does not, what should be done about it"
[411. He also intended to analyze the degree of protection enjoyed by persons
engaged in investments other than securities. In some areas, such as life
assurance, there was no regulation, whereas other investments, such as
authorized trust units, were overregulated. Thus, the review would have to
include investment in commodities, pension funds, building socieities and
provident societies, banking and deposit-taking institutions, and government
securities as well as securities.
Professor Gower rejected the caveat emnptor approach to investor protection.
suggesting instead that an investor could only be "at fault" in those cases
where he could judge the extent of the risk about to be undertaken [42]. He
dismissed the possibility of requiring only greater disclosure because that
would only assist "sophisticated investors" and would not prevent loss caused
by deliberate fraud.
Professor Gower considered the domestic changes that occurred in the
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securities industry over the fifty years leading up to his paper. There had been
a shift from direct personal investment in securities to indirect investment
through life policies, unit trusts, commodity and futures funds and occupational pension schemes. The influence of tax considerations on investments
decisions had increased. Additionally, there had been greater distortions caused
by the different methods of remunerating intermediaries (e.g., the difference
between paying a stockbroker's commission and taking out a life policy). As a
result of these complexities, firms had been established solely to manage and
advise on investments.
International events also had done much to shape the securities industry.
Following the removal of exchange controls in 1979, much investment had
been effected in international markets. This led to the growth of multinational
groups offering a full range of financial services. There had also been directives
and proposed directives from the European Economic Community (EEC)
concerning various aspects of the different investment industries, all of which
would have to be implemented [43). In light of such events, Professor Gower
concluded that some increase in statutory, as opposed to non-statutory,
regulation would be inevitable in the long term.
The Discussion Document outlined the present forms of statutory and
non-statutory regulation and came to some preliminary conclusions. First,
there was no overall system of regulation of investment media and the
securities industry in the United Kingdom. Although disparate attempts had
been made to regulate certain aspects of the investment industry, it was
difficult to determine Nhy one method of regulation was chosen rather than
another in any particular area. The result was to "blur the distinction between
governmental regulation and self-regulation, and between statutory and nonstatutory regulation" [44].
Moreover, the overall tendency in statutory controls was towards regulating
the entities which create investments (banks, insurance companies, and building societies) instead of the market in which the securities are traded or the
intermediaries who sell them or advise on their sale. Finally, Professor Gower
pointed out that the present systema was difficult to enforce effectively. The
existing statutory regulation depends upon criminal proceedings which require
a high standard of proof and thus have a low success rate. Self-regulation. on
the other hand, depends on such non-legal sanctions as adverse publicity.
suspension of listing, and expulsion from the "club".
4.2. Defects of the present regulatory system
Professor Gower's principle criticism of the present system of regulation was
that similar types of investment are treated in a dissimilar manner. This was
partly a result either of policy or of the inherent defects of the PFI Act
compounded by both innovative thinking on the part of those who were

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol7/iss2/1

G.F. Pimlot / Investorprotection in the U.K.

marketing investments and the insufficient flexibility on the part of statutory
authorities to remedy these problems. Examples included the different treatment of authorized unit trusts and open-ended "off-shore" companies [45], the
different treatment of unit trusts and life assurance policies [46], and the
differing extent to which "prospectuses" are regulated depending on the
circumstances of the issue [471.
Professor Gower was also critical of the "fringe and elite" which evolved as
an unexpected result of exempting people from the PFI Act provisions, and
because of the nature of the professional associations which formed the
backbone of the self-regulatory system. The "elite" is made up principally of
the stockbrokers and merchant bankers, who are exempted dealers and subject
to their own rules, and are largely left to run their own affairs. The "fringe" is
composed of those who are licensed dealers under the Prevention of Fraud
Act. "In sophisticated City circles, licensed dealer status ... is regarded almost
as a slur, suggesting that the firm concerned is a fringe operator that is hardly
to be trusted" [48].
Professor Gower further commented that the industry had criticized the
DTI for lax enforcement of the PFI Act. In addition to being criticized for
delays in the granting of licenses, the DTI was faulted for the failure to revoke
a license where the dealer was considered to be unsatisfactory.
Professor Gower also believed that licensing in itself may give an impression
of strong regulation where none previously existed. He expressed concern that
the present system was designed to weed out the dishonest, but not the
incompetent.
As part of the review, Professor Gower identified the advantages and
disadvantages of self-regulation. He noted that self-regulation allows for a
certain degree of flexibility and the ability to make decisions quickly. Self-regulation is also advantageous in that is uses the personal expertise of those
involved in the operations to be regulated. Additionally, a system of self-regulation is not limited to the letter of its rules, but provides the ability to deal
with infringements of the "spirit", thus ensuring high standards. Finally,
self-regulation makes lesser demands on the public purse.
Among its disadvantages, self-regulation carries with it the risks of imprecise and vague rules. There are also difficulties with effective enforcement over
non-members and over those who are not concerned with the possibility of
losing their membership or damaging their reputation. Furthermore, self-regulation could insulate those involved from public, as opposed to professional,
opinion. Finally, there is always the danger that self-interest will outweigh
public interest, or at least will appear to do so. Given these advantages and
disadvantages, Professor Gower concluded that it was the role of government
to decide the major questions involving public policy but that discretionary
power over day-to-day regulation is better handled by the self-regulatory
agencies.
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4.3. Possible lines of reform
Professor Gower believed that in making any decision it was important to
bear in mind the two-fold policy of the present Government to reduce the size
of the Civil Service and cut costs. Any reformed system must also aim to
maintain the City of London as a viable international centre for financial
services. The regulations, therefore, should be no stricter than that of comparable centres.
He also believed that the principle of caveat emptor had to all intents and
purposes been rejected. Although he accepted the distinction between the
individual and the true professional dealer, Gower thought that it was not
attractive to have a regime which distinguishes between different sorts of
purchasers (e.g., rich and poor). Prevention was better than retribution and
some form of compensation fund was required.
Professor Gower outlined five possible approaches to his task and then
proceeded to dismiss the first four. The first option -to do nothing-was not
possible since he was of the opinion that something needed to be done.
The second option involved a revision and extension of the PFI Act. Gower
argued that such a revision by itself would do very little to promote consistency throughout the field. Moreover, it could well cause an increase in the
amount of Civil Service manpower (and thus costs) required to regulate the
large number of investment consultants and advisors.
The third alternative was to consolidate the existing PFI Act with the
sections of the Companies Acts which dealt with issues of securities. He
rejected this option because it "would do nothing to establish a more coherent
and better balanced relationship between Governmental and self-regulation"
[49].
The fourth option was to set up a Securities Commission. Although Professor Gower preferred this choice, he rejected it because it was not "practical
politics" [50].
This left his fifth proposal, which was to create a new system involving both
governmental regulation and self-regulation. This was a compromise designed
to minimize the disadvantages of self-regulation. Enforcement would be improved by giving self-regulatory agencies the backing of statutory powers and
keeping self-interest at bay by making such agencies subject to overall statutory control. The new system would have the additional benefit of taking away
day-to-day supervisory functions from the DTI, which would be consistent
with cost-cutting and Government policy.
He went on to propose a new regulatory framework consisting of four
self-regulatory agencies based on functional lines, one for dealings on The
Stock Exchange, one for dealings off The Stock Exchange and investment
management advice, one for unit trusts, and a take-over and issues agency. The
CSI was suggested as an "umbrella body" to co-ordinate and supervise the
new agencies.
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5. Developments during the period between the Discussion Document and the
Cower Report
5. 1. The Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules 1983
Following the collapses in 1981, the DTI drafted new conduct of business
rules to replace the 1960 Rules. The 1983 Rules [51] were finally declared
effective in June and September of 1983.
While the 1983 Rules impose rules relating to clients' money, requirements
for investment management contracts and, in particular, disclosure of material
interest, they eliminate the detailed requirements for the contents of circulars
offering to purchase or sell securities which had been a feature of the 1960
rules. These requirements are replaced by a statement that "to the extent that
there exist generally accepted standards as to what consitutes good market
practice in respect of any matter not expressly covered by these rules a licensed
dealer should comply with such standards" [52]. The purpose of this statement
is to subject licensed dealers to the non-statutory rules of self-regulatory
bodies, principally the City Code.
The ambit of the City Code was also expanded to cover certain categories of
private companies (having covered only public companies to that date) [53]. A
"general permission" was published under the provisions of the PFI Act that
allowed the publication of a circular offer by anyone (not just a licensed or
exempted dealer) in relation to companies not covered by the City Code [54].
5.2. The EEC admission directives
Professor Gower asserted in his Discussion Document that the implementation of the EEC directives [55] concerning the admission of securities to
listing would alter the balance between statutory control and self-regulation.
At the time of the Discussion Document this was a matter of some debate. It
had originally been thought that the Stock Exchange could be nominated by
the DTI, or the Government, as the "competent authority" for the purposes of
the directives without any formal legislation. It became clear, however, that
legislation would be brought forward, in the form of a Statutory Instrument
made under the European Communities Act 1972. The Stock Exchange Listing
Regulations were published in May, 1984, and became effective in June, 1984,
for securities offered by or on behalf of the Government, and in January, 1985,
for all other listed securities [56].
5.3. Stock Exchange-RestrictivePractices
In 1976 the Restrictive Practices legislation was extended to cover agreements relating to the provision of services [57]. This meant that the Rule Book
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of the Stock Exchange had to be registered as an "agreement" between its
members. The Office of Fair Trading, whose task it is to review registered
agreements, challenged the Rule Book, listing 173 "restrictive practices." The
major areas of challenge were minimum commissions, separation of capacity,
and access to membership.
The Stock Exchange argued that fixed commissions- a minimum percentage
commission levied on any transaction in accordance with a range of rates - were
essential to ensure the observance of "single capacity" (i.e., the separation of
stockbroker and stockjobber) [58]. The "single capacity" system was acknowledged to be one of the major investor protection safeguards because it cut out
the potential conflict of interest that could arise where the stockbroker, the
client's agent, also had an interest in acting as a principal. The Stock Exchange
argued that negotiated commissions would force stockbrokers to act on their
own account buying and selling stocks to get business. This would lead first to
the need to "match" [59] business between clients without the costs of a
market "put-through" [60], and then to competitive market-making between
brokers.
It was also argued that the abolition of minimum commissions would
almost certainly lead to fundamental changes in the nature of the securities
market. Potential effects were said to be fewer firms [61], greater fragmentation
of the market, and an increase in foreign ownership of the firms operating in
the securities industry [62]. In turn this could reduce the capacity of The Stock
Exchange to regulate security dealing and finance its services, notably the
compensation fund.
The Stock Exchange finally agreed to abolish minimum commissions, to
introduce "lay members" to its Council, and to set up a new independent
appeal body in return for the Government exempting the Exchange's Rule
Book from the restrictive practice legislation.
6. The Gower Report
6.1. Introduction
In the midst of these changes Professor Gower published his Report. He
claimed that the responses to his Discussion Document revealed a clear
consensus in favour of a comprehensive system of regulation within a statutory
framework based as far as possible on self-regulation subject to government
surveillance [63]. This contrasts strongly with the published responses from
"the City" as a whole [64]. Professor Gower stated that it seemed "clear ...
that, if self-regulation is to survive, the surveillance to which it is subject must
be sufficient to provide a genuine curb on undesirable restrictive practices and
a sufficient spur to ensure rules are kept under review and their observance
efficiently monitored" [65].
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He also reasserted his basic philosophy that the regulation should not seek
to "achieve the impossible task of protecting fools from their own folly";
instead, regulation "should be no greater than is necessary to protect reasonable people from being made fools of' [66]. He emphasized that it would be
self-defeating to impose restrictions so severe that they would be stricter than
those in competing financial centers and could only be complied with at great
expense.
6.2. Professor Gower's proposal

Consistent with the conclusions of his Discussion Document, Professor
Gower advocated a system based on Self-Regulatory Agencies ("SRAs"), each
responsible for supervising a particular area of activity but with statutory
backing. He was aware, however, of some of the problems with this proposal.
Some firms would need, or wish, to be registered directly with the DTI rather
than with an SRA. In addition, for the time being, an SRA would likely be
based upon present professional and commercial groupings rather than the
type of business in which its members are engaged. This might mean a larger
number of SRAs than would be effective. Moreover, a number of firms would
have to belong to more than one SRA [67].
In response to these problems, he suggested that the PFI Act be replaced by
an Investor Protection Act (IPA). Under the IPA, a governmental agency
would be responsible for overall surveillance and residual regulation of investment business. Day-to-day regulation, however, would be left to the SRAs or
the governmental agency for those registered with it [68]. It would be a
criminal offense to carry on an unregistered investment business [69].
6.2.1. The governmental agency

The Report also discussed whether the governmental agency should be the
DTI or a self-standing commission similar to the Securities and Exchange
Commission of the United States (SEC). Gower concluded that a self-standing
commission would have more expertise, be more distant from the Government,
and closer to the SRAs and the City. Such a commission, however, could only
be justified on cost grounds if it has a substantial workload. Professor Gower
therefore concluded that the governmental agency should be the DTI unless it
became apparent that there was a substantial volume of day-to-day work that
would justify a self-standing commission (e.g., because many people wished to
register directly rather than through an SRA). In such a case, the DTI would
remain responsible for overall surveillance and for making any regulations
which give rise to criminal sanctions. He also modified the role he had foreseen
for the CSI in his Discussion Document. Whilst the central regulatory role
would now be for the governmental agency, he still envisaged a general
co-ordinating role for the CSI, especially if the number of SRAs was to be far
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larger than the few he had originally invisaged. However, he recommended
that the CSI must strengthen its infrastructure and its authority.
6.2.2. Criteriafor recognition,and role and authorityof SRAs
Before the governmental agency [70] would recognize an SRA, there would
have to be a need for the SRA in the relevant field. The SRA must also
establish fair and reasonable rules and practices relating to admission [71],
suspension, expulsion, and discipline of its members. Rules for conduct of
business that give investors adequate protection at least equal to those of the
government agency should also be established. Professor Gower suggested that
these rules should be fashioned after the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of
Business) Rules 1983. Above all, the Rules should provide for "full and frank
disclosure in circumstances where there is a conflict of interests or of interest
and duty" [72]. The rules, however, should not go so far as to impose
restrictions on competition which are greater than necessary for the adequate
protection of investors and the orderly conduct of the relevant business or
market. The SRAs must also have procedures and resources that enable them
to effectively monitor and enforce observation of the rules. The constitutions
of the SRAs should provide for the independence of their governing bodies
from the sectional interests of their members. The constitutions should also
provide effective procedures for investigating complaints against themselves or
their members.
He also recommended that the SRAs be empowered to subpoena witnesses
and to compel the production of documents in disciplinary proceedings. All
information received and findings made during such proceedings should be
protected from actions for defamation and breach of confidence.
Professor Gower discussed the possibility of requiring SRAs to have either a
compensation fund or insurance. Though he strongly suggested that such
protection be established for investors, he did not think it was essential. At a
minimum, there should be proper segregation of a client's money from the
firm's money. The client's money should be held in trust so that it would not
be available to general creditors of the firm in the event of liquidation.
6.2.3. Scope of regulation
The Report includes the following recommendations concerning the scope
of regulation for the different investment fields.
6.2.3.1. The type of investment to be covered. Professor Gower recommended
that all forms of investment, other than investments in physical objects over
which the investor would have exclusive control, should be covered by the IPA.
Such investments would include contracts for commodity or financial futures,
options, and life assurance contracts. Under the IPA the definition of securities
would include investments such as stocks, shares, bonds, and debentures.
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A particular problem under present law is the difficulty of defining what a
gaming contract is because there is no clear legal distinction between gaming
contracts and investments in futures or options. The Act, therefore, should
draw a clear distinction between gaming contracts, which are unenforceable
under English law, and investments [73].
6.2.3.2. Extension of regulation to all investments. Professor Gower also consid-

ered the regulation of those dealing in commodity and financial futures.
During the drafting of the Report, the Association of Futures Brokers and
Dealers was being formed. Professor Gower hoped that this Association could
be recognized as an SRA. The Bank of England's traditional role of surveillance of the Commodity and Future exchanges for market efficiency in relation
to the monetary system would not be affected.
6.2.3.3. Scope of "professionals only" exemption. The Report also concluded

that private and professional investors should receive the same protection.
Presently under the PFI Act, "professionals only" were exempted from the
protection of the Act. In Professor Gower's opinion, however, the exemption
had been abused. As a result, it is had become impossible to insulate those who
are not true "professionals" from invitations to invest which are based on
scant information. Professor Gower recommended that the exemption apply
only to those who carry on an investment, banking, or insurance business. He
also suggested that rules of conduct be established to ensure that the professionals do not advise their non-professional clients to buy or sell such investments unless the professionals have "adequate and reasonable grounds for
their advice and have considered the suitability of the investment for the
person being advised" [74].
6.2.3.4. Investment exchanges. The Gower Report calls for some regulation over
the type of entity that could be called an "investment exchange." It would be
unlawful for any entity not recognized as an investment exchange by the
governmental agency to carry on business as an investment exchange in the
United Kingdom.
Professor Gower suggested that it would neither be necessary nor desirable
for the Eurobond market to be regarded as an "investment exchange," partly
because it is largely a "professionals only" market. Dealers on the Eurobond
market, however, could not be totally excluded from regulation because there
are increasing sales of Eurobonds to private investors. He therefore suggested
that the professional associations involved in dealing in Eurobonds convert
themselves into a SRA and register directly with the governmental agency. An
alternative solution might be to appoint the Association of International Bond
Dealers (which is a Swiss-based Association) as the SRA, or to recognize only
the U.K. branch of it.
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6.2.3.5. The position of life assurance business. Professor Gower examined in
considerable detail the types of regulation of life assurance and unit trusts, the
marketing of which raises a number of problems. The commission paid to
intermediaries often leads to the sale of investments that benefit the intermediary more than the purchaser. Insurance companies lack control over their
agents because the agents are self-employed intermediaries, which allows
insurance companies to distance themselves from the acts of their agents.
Hard-sell marketing methods used by those agents, such as "cold calling" are
difficult, if not impossible, to monitor.
Regulation of these types of investments posed a problem for Professor
Gower. In particular, he criticized the sales of investments by unauthorized
off-shore insurance companies. Some of these investment products are linked
to highly speculative property such as unmined gold and untapped energy.
Presently, overseas registered life insurance companies can freely market their
investment products in the United Kingdom with minimum control by the
Department of Trade. The company only need make it clear on its promotional literature that it is not registered in the United Kingdom.
It is not possible to require insurance companies from EEC Member States
to submit to a registration regime. Accordingly, Professor Gower suggested as
a solution that regulation should be effected by making it an offense to
advertise or circulate long-term insurance business unless the advertisement or
circular complies with the advertising regulations under the Insurance Companies Act 1982.
Professor Gower made several recommendations for the regulation of
long-term insurance business. A Code of Conduct should be established to
impose "cooling off" periods [75], to regulate cold-calling, and to ban unsuitable salespersons. Independent intermediaries should be registered and insurance companies would be held responsible for the salespersons they employ.
Professor Gower would also bring long-term insurance business within the IPA
as far as possible. Under the IPA it would be an offense to promote products
of unauthorized companies. He also recommended that the same underlying
investments be permitted for all types of investment media. The rules relating
to the creation of and offers to the public of authorized unit trusts and other
mutual funds should be conformed. Finally, the DTI's scrutiny of unit trusts
should be relaxed.
6.2.3.6. Regulatioh ofpublic issues and offers. The Report recommended that the
statutory provisions in the Companies Acts relating to public issues, take-overs,
and insider dealing should be transferred to the IPA. Gower suggested that
invitations to the public, whether in connection with a primary or secondary
distribution [76] or a take-over, should be treated similarly.
His principal recommendation in this area was that any document containing an invitation to the public should be "pre-vetted." This would entail
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vetting all take-over documents and primary and secondary issues, which are
presently pre-vetted only if the company is either listed on The Stock Exchange
or has its shares dealt in on the USM. The pre-vetting agency would have to
grant "permission to issue."
The Stock Exchange should continue to pre-vet the issue of securities on its
own listed market and the USM and the CSI should establish a body to pre-vet
issues by member bodies other than The Stock Exchange. The governmental
agency would deal with issues by those who were not members of an SRA.
The Discussion Document had suggested that the role of the Take-over
Panel be extended to conduct all pre-vetting. Professor Gower had realized,
however, by the time he wrote his Report that this would not be practical since
The Stock Exchange would not give up its role in relation to its own markets.
However, he also foresaw that those who registered directly with the governmental agency would not be willing to submit to pre-vetting by either The
Stock Exchange or the CSI.
The division of responsibility relating to the monitoring of take-overs would
remain roughly as it is now between the Panel and the DTI.
Professor Gower went on to recommend that it should be possible to revoke
permission for a public issue where it subsequently became clear that the
prospectus was misleading or incomplete.
6.2.3.7. Company law. Professor Gower went on to suggest certain changes in
the present statutory provisions relating to company law. These changes could
be incorporated in the IPA. These would eliminate differences between issues
of the securities of domestic companies and of foreign companies, between
those of listed and unlisted securities, and between those relating to primary
and secondary distributions. Further recommendations relate to changes in the
laws relating to compulsory acquisition [77] and compensatory payments to
directors on termination of their employment [78]. Additionally, insider dealing
provisions should be extended.
6.2.4. Investigation, enforcement, offenses, and sanctions
One of the major problems with the present regulation is the difficulty of
enforcement. One reason is the failure of the governmental and self-regulatory
investigative authorities to pool their resources, which is in part due to the
different nature of the powers each authority has. Professor Gower recommended, therefore, that the governmental agency and the SRAs be required to
make available to each other any information gathered in the course of official
investigations.
He stressed that inspection powers, if effectively used, would help avoid any
violations of the law. Before authorizing someone to carry on an investment
business, the authority should satisfy itself that a person is "fit and proper" to
do so. Also, the governmental agency or SRAs should have the power to carry
out "spot checks" on the books and papers of any person registered with them
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or any person suspected of engaging in investment business without being
registered. The monitoring and vetting responsibilities of SRAs would likewise
be a valuable preventive function. Professor Gower even advised allowing
SRAs to monitor the practices of non-registered persons to see if they should
be registered.
In order to make the investigatory power effective, it would be necessary to
provide for speedy remedial action such as revocation or suspension of
registration. The governmental agency should also be able to intervene in an
investment business when necessary to protect the clients from further losses.
Such intervention would include prohibiting dealing with assets or vesting
power over the assets in a trustee, and forbidding the firm from entrance in
specified transactions or solicitation of business from those who are not regular
clients.
Professor Gower noted that provisions similar to the two criminal offenses
in the PFI relating to deceptive inducements and distributions of investment
circulars [79] should be included in the IPA [80]. The deceptive inducement
section should cover all investments. A publisher of a newspaper or periodical
should be held liable for publishing an investment advertisement in the
ordinary course of business unless he had no reason to believe it contained an
invitaticn to invest or he had reasonable grounds to believe it was placed by a
person entitled to do so [81]. A publisher, therefore, would have the obligation
to check the register to determine who is entitled to place such an advertisement. With respect to circulars, the "professionals only" exlusion would still
apply.
Any breach of the IPA or regulations made thereunder would also be
considered an offense. Under Professor Gower's proposals, it would also be an
offense if a firm which is registered for investment business did not state so on
its letterhead. The IPA should also provide a civil remedy for persons who
suffer loss as a result of breaches of the IPA or its regulations [82].
Professor Gower went on to recommend further review into the effectiveness of juries in long and complex commercial fraud cases. Although he does
not think substituting a jury with lay assessors having relevant experience
would be politically possible, he nevertheless posed it as a possible solution.
One solution he believed might be politically acceptable would be to use the
magistrate's courts [83] whenever possible to obtain a speedy conviction of
criminals on a lesser offense, such as a breach of the regulations, instead of
trying to obtain further evidence needed for a more serious charge. He
recommended that the maximum fines a magistrate could impose should be
increased.
6.3. ProfessorGower's conclusions
"The system which the recommendations propose needs to be accepted (or
rejected) as a whole and (if accepted) to be brought into operation without
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delay" [841. Although these recommendations are a compromise from his
earlier suggestions, Professor Gower clearly wanted to avoid further compromises. "Further truncation would destroy whatever merits the scheme may have"
[851.
7. Between the Gower Report and the Government White Paper (January
1984-1985)
The debate on the best way to regulate the securities industry intensified
following the publication of Professor Gower's Report in January 1984. In the
preface to the report, Norman Tebitt, the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry, had invited interested parties to submit comments on Professor
Gower's recommendations in anticipation of the Government finalizing its
own preferences and publishing a White Paper in the Autumn of 1984.
By mid-1984, however, the focus of the debate had begun to shift away from
the issues of controlling investment managers and advisers to the question of
how to control conflicts of interest across a much broader area. This concern
arose out of the realignments between banks, stockbrokers, investment
managers, stockjobbers, discount houses, and others in the financial community in London brought about by the prospect of the end of minimum
commissions and single capacity [86]. Efforts were first made to try to establish
the CSI as the U.K. governmental agency, but it became clear from a number
of comments on the Gower Report submitted to the DTI and made public,
that the CSI did not have sufficient support from the most influential practitioners, most notably the leading merchant banks which made up the prestigious Accepting Houses Committee, to enable it to play the "coordinating"
role envisaged by Professor Gower.
In an effort to force the City to produce its own solution, two advisory
groups were formed. The Governor of the Bank of England asked a group of
ten leading City practitioners to advise him on the structure and operations of
a practitioner-based regulatory system. Secondly, the DTI asked the chairman
of the Life Offices Association to form a group whose purpose was to advise
on the prospects for practitioner-based regulation of the marketing of life
assurance and unit trusts.
During the year a number of further "mergers" between stockbroking firms
and other financial institutions were announced and the subject of the potential conflicts of interest which could arise for such entities was debated
endlessly in the press. One feature of this debate was the degree to which the
new "financial conglomerates" would be able to rely ulion the "Chinese Wall"
principle by which internal controls are used to ensure that sensitive information remains locked in separate departments of the organization. Recognized in
law for the first time in the 1980 Conduct of Business Rules, this concept was
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not universally approved as an effective means of preventing the leakage of
price-sensitive information. It was, however, a cornerstone of the argument put
forth by merchant banks and brokerage firms in support of their participation
both in investment management and corporate finance. With the potential
addition of a market-making function, the need for information to be isolated
became even more pressing. Mr. Alex Fletcher, Under-Secretary of State for
Corporate and Consumer Affairs at the DTI, continued to insist that it was for
the self-regulatory system to remodel itself along the "Gower" lines.
During the summer of 1984 the DTI waited for the financial services
industry to reach a consensus on a future self-regulatory framework. Meanwhile,
the financial services industry waited for the DTI to give an indication of the
extent of its support for the Gower Report.
By October, 1984, the views of the two advisory groups had filtered through
to the DTI and Alex Fletcher announced that the Government was thinking
along the lines of introducing two self-regulatory bodies with statutory backing. One would cover the securities investment and futures industry with a
membership of practitioners, users, and independent businessmen. The other
would cover the life assurance and unit trust industries.

8. The White Paper
In January, 1985, the Government published its White Paper on Financial
Services in the United Kingdom [87]. With certain exceptions, the most
important of which concern the question of pre-vetting and the protection to
be afforded to professionals, the Government appears to have accepted the
vast majority of Professor Gower's detailed recommendations [88] and, more
importantly, to have embraced his approach and the majority of the principles
which he set out for the reform of the regulatory system: that like should be
treated alike; that prevention is better than cure; and that effective codes of
conduct should be required [89].
The White Paper is not by any means a complete document, and much of
the detail will only become clear when the Government publishes the parliamentary bill which will be introduced in the 1985-86 parliamentary session.
Nonetheless, the document does say enough to give a reasonably clear picture
of the intended structure [90], the principles to be applied [91], and the
attempted balance between protecting the relatively unsophisticated investor
and permitting the markets to operate flexibility [92]. These twin objectives
appear to be at the heart of Government thinking about the securities
markets - to encourage the private investor back to direct ownership of securities, which investor protection and the elimination of conflicts of interest is
intended to aid, but to leave the "professional" market as untrammelled as
possible in the interest of encouraging business. The White Paper thus states:
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The regulatory framework outlined in this White Paper gives proper prominence to
this time-honoured principle of caveat emptor. But it recognises that caveat emptor
alone is not enough. For investors to have the confidence to venture into the market,
measures are needed to reduce the likelihood of fraud and to encourage high
standards in the conduct of investment business [931.

8.1. Objectives of the new system
The Government stated that its objectives in designing the new framework

were efficiency, competitiveness, confidence, and flexibility [94]. It considered
these objectives to be best met when certain principles were followed. For
instance, the Government emphasized the need for full disclosure about the
investments and services on offer as well as the promotion of competition
among practitioners [95]. Furthermore, the law should be logical and clear and
should treat like alike [96]. Emphasis was placed on the application of high
standards engendered by self-regulation as a means of prevention of fraud [97].
Finally, where such prevention failed, the Government called for vigorous
enforcement [98].
8.2. Structure

Any structure proposed by the Government has been expected to take
account of two policy matters. First, it was originally thought that a Securities
Commission was not practical politics [99], especially for a Conservative
Government which is traditionally thought to rely for support on the City.
Although the Government has therefore had to bear in mind the political effect
of imposing a statutory regime, to some extent it has been able to take the
Gower line that in relation to the Stock Exchange, at least, this step has
become inevitable as a result of the EEC directives on listing requirements and
continuing obligations [100]. The second consideration was cost. The Government has been committed to reducing public expenditure and it has always
been its intention that any new regulatory system should not be paid for out of
public funds [101].
The structure of the regulation proposed in the White Paper fulfils both
these aims. Although necessarily different from Professor Gower's suggestions,
given that the City was unable to agree on the CSI as its representative for the
role of governmental agency, the White Paper nevertheless follows the two
principles advocated by Gower, namely a mixture of self-regulation and
statutory backing [102], and a requirement that it be self-financing [103].
Instead of legislation empowering equally a governmental authority and selfregulatory agencies, the White Paper proposes two boards, the Securities and
Investments Board (SIB) and the Marketing of Investments Board (MIB) [104].
This seeins to amount to a shift marginally further towards Professor Gower's
original preference for a self-standing commission with full power [105]. The
membership of the two boards will consist of practitioners, users, and other lay
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members [106], and each will require an executive which is likely to be made
up of some full-time employees and some persons on secondment, as is
currently the case at both the Panel and The Stock Exchange. The chairman of
each board will be appointed by agreement between the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry and the Governor of the Bank of England [107]. There will
a three-person tribunal, chaired by a legally qualified person, to decide on
appeals from the boards [108].
Since the publication of the White Paper there has been much press
comment and some City opinion to the effect that there should be only one
board with authority across the whole range of activities. Alex Fletcher stated
on February 6, 1985, that, as the White Paper itself had indicated [109], the
Government would consider representations to this effect, although he considered that in the initial stages quicker progress might be made if the burden
were to be divided.
8.3. The system of regulation
With certain minor exceptions, the Government accepted Professor Gower's
recommendations. A new Act will provide for the Secretary of State to have
the power to authorize persons to engage in investment business, and to lay
down requirements for the conduct of these businesses [110]. Although there
are some minor areas in which the White Paper does not go as far as Gower, it
-is accepted that the definition of "investments" be broadened as Gower
recommended and that "investment business" be defined [111].
As recommended by Professor Gower, life assurance policies and units in
unit trusts are to fall within the scope of the regulation [112]. However,
insurance companies would not need to be separately authorized by the
boards. Current DTI authorization under the Insurance Company Act 1982
would suffice [113].
The Secretary of State will be empowered to delegate his powers to the
boards, who would thereby become legally entitled to recognize other self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and thus confer on their members the ability to
conduct investment business. The boards would also have the authority to
regulate the rules and practices of the SROs. As the White Paper states, "to
provide for a statutory power of authorisation and regulation to be given to a
private sector body is unprecedented. The bodies will be enabled to make rules
with the force of law and to ensure that businesses comply with them" [115].
Such power, however, will also carry accountability. The Act will accordingly require the boards to report annually to Parliament and the Secretary of
State will reserve the power to withdraw the authority he has delegated, and to
require a board to change or withdraw rules which are considered to be
contrary to the interests of competition (if the Secretary of State has been so
advised by the Director General of Fair Trading), or where they are contrary
to the international obligations of the United Kingdom [116].
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8.4. Criteriafor recognition

The Boards would need to appear to the Secretary of State to meet certain
criteria which are by and large those suggested by Professor Gower [117) as the
minimum for recognition with respect to an SRA (i.e., proper review and
complaints procedures, compensation arrangements, the ability to monitor and
enforce its own rules, the separation of clients' funds, and so forth) [1181. Two
of these criteria are that all investment businesses should demonstrate, to the
boards or to an SRO, that they are "fit and proper", and that each board or
SRO has proper rules for the conduct of business [1191.
The White Paper deals at some length with the principles which should form
the basis of conduct of business rules, preferring to leave the boards and the
SROs to formulate the detailed rules themselves [120]. In particular, it sets out
in some detail the safequards which it envisages that the legislation would
provide in the area of conflict of interests.
The first safeguard would be a principle of fair dealing which is intended to
be the basis for specific rules prohibiting unfair practices and requiring
investment business to be conducted in accordance with good market practice
[121]. Second, there would be a duty of skill, care, diligence in the provision of
investment advice and the transaction of investment business [122]. Finally,
there would be a duty to disclose various matters including any material
interest which the investment business had in a proposed transaction, the
capacity in which it would act (e.g., whether the client would be employing the
person as agent to acquire investments on his behalf from another, or as
principal buying the investments for its own account or selling them to the
customer from its own book) [123].
In addition, when an investment business acts as agent, the general rules of
agency and the consequent fiduciary duties would apply. The White Paper
suggests that there should be a best execution principle whereby all instructions from a client must be executed to the client's best advantage (i.e., no
investment business could deal with a client from its own book unless this
resulted in better terms for the client) [124]. The White Paper further recommends a subordination of interest requirements (i.e., that a client should be
given priority in the execution of orders when an investment business is also
dealing on its own account) [125].
The Act would require full disclosure in a number of areas, including
conflict of interest, terms and conditions of business [126] and, in the area of
life assurance, the rates of commission [127].
8.5. Professionals

One area in which the Government has not accepted Professor Gower's
recommendations is in the area of the protection required by "professionals."
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Gower had recommended that the "professionals only" exemption had been
abused and was difficult to police, since there was no effective definition of
who was, and who was not, a professional, and no means of preventing
professionals passing information on to others who were not [128]. Whilst
accepting these arguments, the White Paper insists that the principle of a
"professionals only" exemption fits well with the Government's concern to
avoid over-regulation [129]. It therefore intends to extend the "professionals
only" exemption to all investments and to allow for the creation of a new type
of unit trust to be known as a "restricted unit trust" which would replace the
unauthorized unit trust. No prospectus need be published (which the White
Paper introduces as a requirement for the authorized unit trust) if the unit trust
is open only to professionals and the range of investments would not be
limited [130]. Moreover, the ability to distribute circulars to professionals
would be retained and extended [131]. Whilst accepting that the policing of
this exemption could create difficulties, the Government thought that it was
not appropriate to try to define those who qualified as professionals. Instead,
the Government preferred laying on an investment business a duty of care to
distribute the relevant information only to persons who appeared to the
business to have the requisite understanding and resources. This is to be
known as the "know your customer rule" [132].
8.6. Enforcement
The boards and the SROs will be responsible for enforcing their own rules,
and the DTI and prosecution authorities for enforcing criminal law [133]. As
recommended by Gower, civil law remedies such as disgorgement orders will
be introduced. The principal sanction which could be imposed by the board
will be the revocation of the authority to carry on investment business. The
carrying on of such business without authority will be a breach of the criminal
law [134]. The White Paper also recognizes that co-operation between the
various bodies and the pooling of inforniation will be essential for effective
enforcement [135].
8.7 Ancillary matters
The White Paper adopts many of Professor Gower's suggestions including
those on the retention and scope of the deceptive inducement and circularisation offences [1361, clarifying gaming contracts [137], cold-calling and coolingoff periods [138], amendments to company law, and the standardization and
contents of prospectus and public offer requirements [139]. In some cases the
detail of these is left to the boards and SROs to define, whereas in other cases
the new Act will do so [140]. Insider dealing provisions will be extended to
cover all investments [141]. The White Paper, however, accepts neither the
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proposals about pre-vetting public offers [142] nor those about the granting
and revocation of permissions to issue [143]. The White Paper also invited
suggestions as to whether or not statutory backing should be given to the Panel
[144].

9. Some final comments
There remain, even following the White Paper, many features of the new
system still to be worked out. Will there be one board or two? If there will be
two boards and the DTI, how will the problems of co-ordination be overcome?
How will the Panel be brought within the system? How many and what kinds
of bodies will be recognized as SROs- the existing trade associations or
organizations based on their function as originally envisaged by Gower? What
do the Government mean when they say in the White Paper "the Government
are not convinced that total reliance can be placed on Chinese Walls"? [1451
How will the legal and self-regulatory aspects work together? Is effective
self-regulation compatible with the requirements of competitive law? Moreover, the final shape of the financial institutions in London and the nature of
the market in which they will be expected to operate still remain unclear.
It seems likely therefore that the plans will need to be refined and updated
before the new regulatory edifice can be put into place, but two things seem
relatively certain not to change: self-regulation-despite the number of times
the word appears in the White Paper-has given way to the statutory regulation. In return for statutory backing, the boards and SROs will have ceded
the right to the DTI to require rule changes and amendments to their
constitutions. Secondly, the cost of the system will fall, ultimately, upon those
buying and selling investments and investment advice.
With hindsight it seems inevitable that, given Government's policy requirements, the requirements of standardization throughout the EEC, and the City's
disjointed response, the system of self-regulation which has served the
mainstream securities industry well in the past would give way to a statutory
system. It does seem perverse, however, that the lacunae in the PFI Act and the
inefficiency of the DTI in running the statutory lincensing system under it,
compared with the comparative efficiency and protection offered by the
self-regulatory system, should have resulted in the potential abolition of the
self-regulatory system and the creation of a statutory one, in which the
ultimate power resides with the Secretary of State, but the reponsibility and
cost fall on the practitioners and users of the system. It does somewhat smack
of the Government having its cake and eating it too.
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Notes
[1] Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for Investor Protection,
Cmd. No. 9432 (1985) [hereinafter cited as White Paper].
[2] The main object of both unit trusts and open-ended investment companies is the collective
investment of capital provided by the public in a portfolio of securities, thereby spreading the risk
of investment. These differ, however, in that in a unit trust the members of the public who
participate are beneficiaries under a trust. Each beneficiary does not have any interest in particular
assets held by the trust. Instead, all beneficiaries have a collective beneficial ownership of the
assets in the trust fund, together with a right, as against the trustees, to receive a repayment of
moneys equivalent to the portion of the trust fund attributable to his interest.
In contrast, an investment company (IC) is not a trust at all, but rather a limited company with
a share capital formed for the purpose of holding securities or other property by way of
investment. The shareholders have a direct interest in the shares of IC but no direct legal or
beneficial interest in its assets (i.e., the underlying property or securities). An IC is described as
"open ended" when it is formed in ajurisdication which permits the redemption and issue of share
capital at the instigation of the manager. It thus has no fixed maximum issued capital and is "open
ended".
[3] L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection: A Discussion Document, 14-15 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Discussion Document].
[4] L.C.B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection: Report, Part I, Cmd., No. 9215 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Gower Report].
[5] The statutory regulation of securities is comprised of legislation covering primary issues to
the public Companies Act 1948, §§ 37-51, 55, 417-423, Sched. 4; insider dealing, Companies Act
1980, §§ 68-73; and that relating to secondary distributions and take-over offers, Prevention of
Fraud (Investments) Act 1958 ("the PFI Act") and the rules promulgated under it.
[6] The main professional bodies covering those in the field are The Stock Exchange which
covers stockbrokers, the Accepting Houses Committee which covers the top merchant banks, the
National Association of Dealers and Investment Managers, the Association of Investment Trust
Companies, and the Unit Trust Association.
[7] Companies Act 1948, § 113.
[8] Government Stocks and Other Securities Investment Co. v. Christopher, [1956] 1 WLR 237.
[9] Companies Act, 1948, § 39 (in respect of companies incorporated in Great Britain) 418 (in
respect of overseas companies). § 39 was repealed by Regulation 7(4) of The Stock Exchange
(Listing) Regulations 1984,.
[10] Companies Act, 1980, Part 5, §§ 68-73.
[11] The offering of facilities for "margin" transactions involved a scheme whereby a victim
was persuaded to speculate in shares and deposit cash, or his own securities, with a dealer of
security for the "margin". The victim would believe that is deposit would be returned to him,
except insofar as is necessary to pay any losses or expenses when the transaction had been
"closed". In fact the dealer neither bought nor intended to buy shares. He simple operated an
account which showed at first a profit so as to induce the victim to increase the extent of his
dealing and to put up more security, and which ultimately showed enough loss to extinguish the
whole of the "margin" and forfeit the security. Bodkin Committee Report, Cmd. No. 5539 (1936).
[12] PFI Act, 1958, § 1; PFI Act, 1939, § 1.
[13 PFI Act, 1958, § 5; PET Act, 1939, § 5.
[14] PFI Act, 1958, § 7; PF Act, 1939, § 7.
[15] PFI Act, 1958, § 2; PFI Act, 1939, § 2. The DTI can declare someone an exempted dealer
if the person carries on as his main business, some business other than that of dealing in securities,
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or the dealing in securities amounts to the issue of a prospectus, an underwriting, the making of an
offer for sale, the inviting of subscription for government securities, or dealing with a "professional" (which is defined as "a person whose business involves the acquisition and disposal, or the
holding, of securities"). Id.
[16] Throughout the rest of the article "exempted dealer" refers both to those exempted by the
DTI and those whose activities are excepted from the scope of the PFI Act.
[171 PFI Act, 1958, § 13; PFI Act, 1939, §12.
[181 PFI Act, 1958, § 14; PFI Act, 1939, § 13.
[191 PFI Act 1939 §§ 7, 20 (authority to make rules).
[20) 1939 Rules, 1939 STAT. R.&O. 2757, Part 1, Rule 2.
[21] 1939 Rules, 1939 STAT. R.&O. 2758, Part I, Rule 3. "Cold-calling" refers to the making
of uninvited telephone calls or visits to a prospective investor in order to persuade him to enter a
transaction.
[2211939 Rules, 1939 STAT. R.&O. 2758. Part II, Rules 6-8.
[23] 1939 Rules, 1939 STAT. R.&O. 2759, Part III, Rules 9-12.
[24] 1960 Rules, 1960 STAT. INST. 386 Rule 1.
[25] 1960 Rules, id. Rule 1(d).
[26] Discussion Document, supra note 3, at 33.
[27] The Stock Exchange Rules § 900 (1984).
[281 Id at § 910-1.
[291 Id.
[30] Specifically, the CSI has published the Code of Conduct for Dealers in Securities (1980),
Guidelines for Personal Dealings by Fund Managers (1981), and the Rules Governing Substantial
Acquisitions of Shares (1981). These latter rules are designed to curb "dawn raids", which are
purchasing operations carried out (historically at the opening of business) on The Stock Exchange
for a significant percentage (14.9%) of a company's shares.
[31] See Discussion Document, supra note 3, at 14-15.
[32] Id. at 14-16.

[33] Id.
[34] "Authorised unit trusts" are those authorized by the Department of Trade if the "unit
trust scheme" fulfils certain conditions. According to Professor Gower, the most important of
these conditions is that both the managers and the trustees are corporate bodies, incorporated
under the law of some part of the United Kingdom or any other state of the EEC and that the
trustee fulfils certain conditions specified in the First Schedule to the satisfactionof the Department.
For more detail, see Gower Report, supra note 4, at 85.
[35] Id.
[36] The Financial Times, Mar. 7, 1981.
[371 The Stock Exchange statement on Halliday Simpson & Co., October 28, 1982.
[38] The Financial Times, Sept. 4, 1981.
[39] The Financial Times, Dec. 19, 1981.
[40] Discussion Document, supra note 3.
[41] Id. at 4.
[42] Id.
[43] European Community directive for admission, 79/279/EEC, dealt with coordinating the
conditions for admission of securities to official stock exchange listing.
The Listing Particular Directive no. 80/390/EEC dealt with coordinating requirements for the
drawing up, scrutinizing, and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the
admission of securities to official stock exchange listing.
The Iterim Reports directive, no. 82/121/EEC concerned information to be published on a
regular basis by companies, the shares of which have been admitted to official stock exchange
listing.
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[44] Discussion Document, supra note 3, at 53.
[45] Under the PFI Act a unit trust can only be "authorized" if it invests in securities and it is
an offense to distribute a circular relating to an unauthorized fund. Because of this, those wishing
to market a vehicle which could invest in commodities, financial futures, or land had formed
open-ended companies in an "off-shore" center which permitted such a form of company. The
shares in such companies (which were "securities" withing the PFI Act) were then marketed by
exempted and licensed dealers and a listing on The Stock Exchange was obtained to avoid the
necessity of filing a prospectus for each new issue of shares.
[46] In 1973 the Scott Committee's Report on property bonds and equity-linked life assurance
had recommended that linked life insurance policies should be regulated as insurance rather than
investment business. PropertyBonds and Equity Linked Life Assurance Committee, Cmd. No. 5281
(1953). As a result of their recommendations, the Insurance Comanies Act 1974 specifically
excluded all contracts of insurance from the scope of the PFI Act. The result was that those who
market life assurance may "sell" investments in unauthorized unit trusts free from any prohibition
under the PFI Act.
[47] At the time of the Discussion Document an issue of securities by a company listed on the
Stock Exchange had to comply with the prospectus provisions of the Companies Act 1948 and the
Stock Exchange's own listing requirements and the prospectus would be "pre-vetted" by The
Stock Exchange. In other words, the prospectus would be checked by The Stock Exchange prior to
being published to ensure it complies with the provisions cited. This contrasts with other issues
such as: an unlisted company's issue of a prospectus, where the provisions of the Companies Act
1948 alone have to be complied with and where the Registrar of Companies does not pre- or
post-vet the prospectus; secondary distributions of shares, which are governed by the PFI Act
rather than the Companies Act prospectus provisions; and the issue of a share exchange take-over
offer, which is regulated by the PFI Act and the City Code, and where applicable, The Stock
Exchange regulations rather than the Companies Act prospectus provisions.
[48] Discussion Document, supra note 3, at 70-71.
[49] Id. at 89.
[50] Id. at 91.
[51] 1983 Rules, 1983 STAT. INST. 1839.
[52] 1983 Rules, 1983 STAT. INST. 1855, Rule 27.
[53] The private companies covered are those which had some kind of public involvement in the
ten years prior to the arnouncement of an offer for them. The type of public involvement involves
companies (a) whose shares have been listed on The Stock Exchange; (b) where dealings in its
shares have been advertised in a newspaper on a regular basis for a continuous period of six
months; (c) whose shares have been traded on the Unlisted Securities Market; or (d) where a
prospectus for the issue of equity shares was filed at the Companies Registry.
Note that the Panel has the flexibility to exempt companies which meet the above requirements
in cases where the provisions of the Code may not be appropriate. City Code-Introduction page
A3 at para. 3.
[54] PFI Act 1958, § 14(2), permission to distribute documents; General Permission No. 3
effective June 1, 1983.
[55] For numbers of directives see supra note 43.
(56] The Stock Exchange (Listing) Regulations, 1984, STAT. INST. 716. The enabling power
for the Statutory Instrument comes from the European Communities Act, 1974, § 2(2).
[57] The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 renders void any restriction of a type cited in the
Act contained in any agreement of a type cited in the Act and found by the Restrictive Practices
Court to be contrary to the public interest. The purpose of the legislation was to proscribe certain
anti-competitive practices. Agreements had to be between two or more concerned parties carrying
on business in the United Kingdom in the supply of goods. The restrictions included such things as
agreements to fix prices, or the terms or conditions subject to which goods are supplied; the
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quantity to be produced; and process of manufacture. Later these provisions were extended to
agreements relating to the supply of services. Each member of The Stock Exchange performed
services in the United Kingdom and The Stock Exchange Rule Book was considered to amount to
an agreement among them all which contained potentially anti-competitive practices.
[581 A stockbroker acts as agent for his client and buys and sells securities on behalf of the
client. A jobber is not allowed to deal directly with the general public but only with brokers or
other jobbers. Jobbers operate in partnerships or companies and specialize in the securities of
certain companies. There is usually more than one jobber in the shares of the larger listed
companies, although there can be only one in those of smaller listed companies. This division of
capacity between broker and jobber depends on the support of all involved for its survival and is
expected to disappear once fixed commissions are abolished and brokers are working on the basis
of negotiated commissions. It is argued that, in order to offer securities at competitive prices,
brokers will find it necessary to take positions in the securities so that they can buy and sell
themselves.
[591 "Match" business: to find a buyer and a seller of roughly equivalent amounts.
[60] The "put-through" concept arose from the rules on separation of capacity which require
stock to be bought from ajobber. Where a match can be arranged the jobber is given a "turn", say
one-eighth of 1%, to put the stock onto his books from one client and sell if off his books to the
other. This is called "putting the stock through the market".
[611 The changes will lead to feiverfirms of stockbrokers because fixed commissions protected
stockbrokers at the expense of investors with a fixed rate for doing business and, therefore, there
was no competition on price. The abolition of fixed commissions would lead to significant
competition and, possibly, some initial loss-leading by the bigger firms. This could result in a
number of medium-sized firms with neither specialist niches nor private client business, nor the
capital backing to enable them to buy and sell substantial quantities of securities finding trading
conditions difficult, if not impossible.
[621 Under the old rules, dealings on The London Stock Exchange could only be conducted by
member firms. Membership could only be obtained after an "examination" had been passed.
Overt or covert discrimination resulted in the situation where only U.K. residents were members,
and non-U.K. residents could only own a certain percentage of a member firm.
This rule has now been relaxed and non-U.K. residents may own up to 29.9% of a member firm
and it is predicted that this will increase to 100%. This has already, and will continue to result in
increasing foreign ownership as foreign, particularly North American, organizations take advantage
of this opportunity to gain access to London's financial markets. Stockbroking firms in the United
Kingdom act as agents for their clients and are usually partnerships that do not have a great deal
of their own capital. Part of the reason the British Government supported the Office of Fair
Trading's case for the abolition of restrictions from member firms was that it wanted to maintain
London's viability as a financial market and considered that this would be impossible without the
injection of capital.
[63] Gower Report, supra note 4, at 2.
[64] "The City" includes members of the Stock Exchange, merchant and clearing banks, and
insurance companies which together operate in London's financial market and which are all based
around the Stock Exchange in the part of London known historically as "The City". Many of the
bodies representing City institutions published their own responses to the document, most of
which were hostile to Gower's conclusions. The main concerns of the self-regulatory bodies, such
as The Stock Exchange, have been the principle of governmental control and the ability to interfere
in their affairs. There was a general feeling that the main institutions- the members of The Stock
Exchange and the merchant banks-had provided effective investor protection themselves for some
years. It was the "fringe" which had caused such problems as there had been and it had not proved
possible in the past to find an effective organization to monitor them. They believed that whilst
there may be merit in updating the prospectus provisions of the Companies Acts, extending the
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scope of the PFI Act to cover a wider range of investments and licensing investment managers and
consultants, and whilst the 1960 Rules needed to be updated to ensure separation of clients' funds
and proper disclosure of conflict of interest, etc., there was no need for a wholesale revision of the
way securities had been issued and marketing for many years.
[65] Gower Report, supra note 4, at 11.
[66] Id. at 7.
[67] Some fims would prefer to be registered directly with the DTI because the nature of their
business would put them into competition with the appropriate SRA. Harvard Securities, for
example, is making a market in shares and, as such competes with The Stock Exchange. The Stock
Exchange was thought to be likely to form one SRA and Harvard Securities would have been
unlikely to submit to its direction. Furthermore, if an SRA had been formed by the issuing houses,
they would have been unlikely to allow certain of the licensed dealers to become members and it
would have been easier for them to register directly with the DTI. Gower Report, supra note 4, at
10.
[68] Investors would bear the expense of day-to-day regulation, thereby helping to achieve the
government's goal of reducing manpower and cutting costs. Note that Gower envisaged the CSI,
with an expanded staff, coordinating the activities of the SRAs.
[69] "Investment business" would be defined so as to cover all those professionally engaged in
the marketing of investments. This would cover those who manage investments, those who advise,
financial journalists, and people circulating "tip sheets." It would not, however, include bona fide
investment clubs, though it would include a professional manager of the club's investments.
[70] Throughout the rest of this article "governmental agency" refers to the body envisaged by
Gower as either a self-standing commission or the DT1.
[71] Rules relating to admission to membership should ensure that those who undertake
investment business are fit and proper persons as evidenced by their character, training and
experience, and financial resources. The IPA should empower the governmental agency to prohibit
any registered firm from employing anyone who is found quilty of an offense involving fraud or
who committed a breach of the IPA. Gower also suggests that the governmental agency should
maintain a comprehensive computerized register of those entitled to undertake investment business. Firms in foreign countries could be registered if their country had comparable regulations
and afforded U.K. firms reciprocal rights. The IPA should also give the govermental agency the
power to suspend, not only revoke, registration in appropriate cases.
[72] Gower Report, supra note 4, at 62.
[73] In 4.04 of the Report, Gower gives an example of arrangements for betting on whether
the quoted price of a listed stock or an index will rise or fall, which would seem akin to gaming and
wagering contracts and therefore unenforceable. He goes on to say, however, that the objectives of
the participants may be indistinguishable from those who purchase options or futures. The present
law is so unclear on this that the founders of the London International Financial Futures
Exchange were concerned that some of its contracts might be regarded as gaming and wagering
contracts. Id. at 27.
[74] Id. at 37.
[75] A cooling-off period is the time, after a decision to invest has been made, in which the
investor is entitled to cancel the investment. Id. at 117.
176] The prospectus provisions should also apply to secondary issues even where the issuer is
not the company or an officer and therefore it may not be possible for him to obtain up-to-date
information from the company.
[77] Compulsory acquisition refers to a power to acquire the shares of shareholders who dissent
from a scheme or contract approved by a nine-tenths majority, that involves a transfer of shares to
another company. Companies Act, 1948, § 209.
[78] Companies Act, 1948, §§ 191-194.
[79] "Circulars" would include communications, beyond just written, and a series of communications containing similar information. Professor Gower, however, does not think it is practical to
prohibit oral solicitations other than by placing restrictions on cold-calling.
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[80]
[811
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]
[871
[881
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93]
[941
[95]
[961

PFI Act, §§ 13 and 14.
Under present law, a publisher is not liable for publishing an investment advertisement.
See Gower Report, supra note 4, at 179.
The magistrate's court is the lowest tier of the criminal courts.
Gower Report, supra note 4, at 188.
Id.
See supra text acompanying notes 58-62.
White Paper, supra note 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-83.
White Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
Id. at 13-16.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8-12.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.

[971 Id.
[981 Id.
[99] See supra text accompanying note 50.
[100] See supra text accompanying notes 55, 56.
[101] See supra text at section 4.3.
[102] White Paper, supra note 1, at 13-14.
[103] Id. at 16.
[104] Id. at 13.
[105] See supra text accompanying note 50.
[106] White Paper, supra note 1, at 14.

[1071 Id.
[108] Id. at 15.
[109] Id. at 13.
[1101 Id. at 8.
[111] Id. at 8-9.
[112] Id. at 9.
[1131 Id. at 28.
[114] Id. at 14-15.
[115] Id. at 14.
[116] Id. at 14-15.
[117] See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
[118] White Paper, supra note 1, at 14.

[119] Id.
[120] Id. at 19-22.
[121] Id. at 20.
[122] Id.

[123] Id.
[124] Id.

[125] Id.
[126]
[1271
[1281
[129]
[130]

Id. at 28.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
White Paper, supra note 1, at 12.
Id. at 27.
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[131] Id.
[132] Id. at 21.
[133] Id. at 39.
[134] Id. at 40.
[135] Id.
[136] Id. at 33.
[137] Id. at 11.
[138) Id. at 33.
[139] Id. at 35.
[140] Id. at 14.
[141] Id. at 37.
[142] Id. at 36.
[1431 Id.
[144] Id. at 36.
[145] Id. at 20.
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